A Spinozean Unconscious? Some Remarks on Deleuze’s Problematic Inscription of Spinoza’s Ontology in Psychoanalysis by Villacañas de Castro, Luis S.
215A Spinozean Unconscious? Some Remarks on Deleuze’s Problematic…
Res publica, 25, 2011, pp. 215-226
A Spinozean Unconscious? Some Remarks on Deleuze’s 
Problematic Inscription of Spinoza’s Ontology in 
Psychoanalysis1
Luis S. Villacañas de Castro
Porque la falta, en psicoanálisis, es algo positivo. La falta existe bajo 
la forma de lo que Freud llamó la castración; y existe, además, la 
privación y también la frustración. Hay varios tipos de faltas, varios 
tipos de agujeros; por esa razón no podemos ser spinocianos en 
psicoanálisis.2
1.  
This essay locates itself in the whereabouts of the following thesis: the 
post-structuralist reading of psychoanalysis, as developed specially by Gilles 
Deleuze, might be based on a particular reading of Spinoza’s God as infinite 
substance.
Everything stems, thus, from the definition that appears in sixth place 
in the Ethics: «By God, I understand Being absolutely infinite, that is to 
say, substance consisting of infinite attributes, each one of which expresses 
eternal and infinite essence» (E, I, Def. 6).3 To which, one must add the 
accompanying «Explanation: I say absolutely infinite but not infinite in its 
own kind (in suo genere); for of whatever is infinite only in its own kind, 
we can deny infinite attributes; but to the essence of that which is absolutely 
infinite pertains whatever expresses essence and involves no negation». 
This is the definition of what I shall call the ontological structure, the key 
concept of which is infinity. As I see it, at the nucleus of Spinoza’s philosophy, 
1 This essay was originally delivered as a brief talk at the Centre of Modern Thought and 
Hispanic Studies of the University of Aberdeen, 16 May 2009, in the context of the Conference 
«Republicanism I: Marrano Views on Empire and Democracy». I thank the scholars that were 
present during the session, whose comments and responses I have kept in mind while writing this 
final version. 
2 J.-A. Miller, «Del saber inconsciente a la causa freudiana I», Introducción a la clínica 
lacaniana. Conferencias en España, RBA, Barcelona, 2006, p. 205. All the talks gathered in this 
book were originally delivered in Spanish. 
3 This edition of Benedict De Spinoza’s Ethics corresponds to the English translation 
made by W.H. White, and revised by A.H. Stirling, published by Oxford University Press. 
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and especially of his Ethics, stands a most correct and rigorous definition of 
infinity –whatever that’s worth. 
Now, as regards the definition just quoted, we must bear in mind that, 
if there exists an infinite substance, this is because there is an infinite 
intellect on the first place (God’s), whose main function is precisely to 
conceive of the infinite forms of being that may be possible –that is, of all 
that can be. Also, one must remember that it is characteristic of such God 
to do so exclusively on account of an internal necessity (that is, by cause 
of itself), a principle which is better understood when identified with an 
absolute productive function. Again, this functional principle should be 
read vis-à-vis infinity, so that cause-of-itself, an exclusively productive 
function and infinity become three co-related terms, concepts whose 
meaning is shaped by the same structural frame. If God’s infinite intellect 
must produce all that can be –not some sort of beings in opposition to 
others, and not due to a partial desire, interest or need, but motivated by 
an absolute and internal desire of producing everything that can be–, if all 
this is the case, then the only aim of its productivity would be to attain and 
actualize infinity. 
This will help us to understand that God’s intellect is ontological. The 
spectrum of His infinite intellect coincides with the spectrum of substance, 
with the infinite attributes and their respective modes, with the realm of 
being as a whole. It embraces being in general, all forms of being –and 
not only ideas, as the term «intellect» might induce us to think at first. For 
instance, bodies are also acts of God’s intelligence –we will later insist on 
this point a bit more. For God, to intellect and to bestow being are equivalent 
operations. Actually, to be is just to be in God’s intellect; to be is simply to 
be thought by God, independently of the manner of being involved in each 
case.
Now, in accordance with the laws of reason, the way God’s intellect 
proceeds is analytical in manner: first, it conceives of an infinite number of 
attributes, an attribute being that which an «intellect perceives of substance, 
as if constituting its essence» (E, I, Def. 4). Again, we can imagine an infinite 
substance as implying infinite essences; but the key resides in that these 
infinities depend directly on the possibility of an infinite intellect, since only 
then could an infinite number of qualities be conceived (and something like 
an infinite substance make any sense). We are dealing, therefore, with an 
infinite number of intelligible essences, or qualities, that only exist insofar as 
such a thing can be apprehended by an all-conceiving God. 
To this, one must add, on a second level, the infinity of modes that each 
attribute involves by itself. This is conveyed by the second clause of the 
sixth definition, where, speaking of the attributes, Spinoza adds: «each one 
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of which expresses eternal and infinite essence». What is here involved is 
the fact that there are infinite ways in which each of these qualities might be 
thought of. That is: there are infinite ways in which they could differ within 
the range that constitutes their essence –and God’s infinite intellect takes good 
care to think of all of them. Such variations are, precisely, the modes. They 
are defined as «affections of substance, or that which is in another thing (that 
is, in the attributes of the substance) through which also it is conceived» (E, 
I, Def. 5). Modes are therefore variations of a substance as conceived in and 
through the modifications of an attribute. 
All this is summarized by Spinoza himself by saying that God «can 
think an infinitude of things in infinite ways, or (which is the same thing, by 
Prop. 16, pt. 1) can form an idea of His essence and of all the things which 
necessarily follow from it» (E, II, Prop. 3, Demonst.). 
Of course, once we reach this point, we can already discriminate between 
God’s infinite intellect and human finite thought. This distinction is essential. 
While God’s intelligence relates to all forms of being, human thought (which 
is included in the former) only has to do with ideas, which are the modes of 
being proper to one attribute only: thought. The ideas produced by the human 
mind are just one of the infinite ways God’s infinite intellect conceives of 
infinite being, and produces being thereby.
Finally, a basic thesis already comes to the fore, which we must bear in 
mind: in Spinoza’s ontology, to be conceived by God is the precondition of 
existence. 
2
Having said this, a potential misunderstanding must be dissolved at once. 
It goes like this: one might think that infinite substance consists of an infinite 
number of sets (the attributes), each with an infinite number of members (the 
modes) –but it is not so. Firstly: we are always speaking of a single infinity 
(there can’t be a plurality of infinities). Secondly, and derived from the first: 
we can only speak of sets and members once the qualification carried out 
by the attributes has come into play. Basically, the latter stand as the infinite 
ways in which a single infinity could be conceived of, every time under a 
different quality. The same infinity is seen differently through the prisms 
that the attributes present. For example, should we return to the distinction 
between human thought and God’s infinite intellect, we would say that it is 
through human thought that God’s intellect expresses its infinity in the form 
of ideas. 
With this we come to what Gilles Deleuze called modification in his major 
work on Spinoza, Expressionism in Philosophy. According to this process, 
218 Luis S. Villacañas de Castro
Res publica, 25, 2011, pp. 215-226
each individual belonging to the same infinity is repeated under each of the 
attributes, each time as a different mode.4 
As we see, modes are a form of existence internal to attributes only (E, 
I, Prop. 10). Provided this, Deleuze’s next move is the following: God’s 
intellect being infinite, he believes that there is a specific form of being 
that Spinoza’s infinite attributes could not account for. In other words, 
there would still remain an ontological niche that neither attributes nor their 
respective modes could fill. We can see that at this point Deleuze attempts 
to do justice to Spinoza’s definition of infinity in more coherent a manner 
than Spinoza himself. His line of reasoning goes like this: infinite substance 
should also include within itself a form of being that cannot be understood 
under the scope of any quality or essence whatsoever, but rather as the lack 
of it, as a qualitative indetermination or at least as an incomplete qualitative 
realization. One should not confuse this option with nothingness or absolute 
indetermination, but rather take it as a partially undetermined, relatively 
undefined or in some measure undifferentiated form of being. Also, we could 
well understand it in terms of a potential state. Such a form of being, indeed, 
would not come to be via the attributes, but would appear somewhere else in 
Spinoza’s system. It would not partake of a modal form of existence. 
Let’s see if we can make more sense out of this. As we shall see, another 
way to explain how attributes actualize being is that they force it into the 
mold of the identity principle, another formulation of which can be found 
in Spinoza’s thesis that determination involves negation and, also, in the 
mathematical paradigm. Again, this means that modal being relates and 
differs within the logics of presence, so to say. In opposition to this, the best 
way to understand the speculative challenge posed by Deleuze might be to 
imagine that, prior to crossing the threshold implied by attributes, something 
that shall come to be an infinite series of modes already exists in a way that 
doesn’t conform neither to an ontic paradigm nor to the identity principle, 
in any of its attribute variants. Be it what may (Deleuze will speak of it in 
Difference and Repetition and in his The Logic of Sense in terms of virtuality), 
it cannot be thought as a member of a set, let alone an infinite one. For it is 
not yet sufficiently determined. In opposition to extension, to difference in 
space or on the axis of chronological time, Deleuze argues that at this point 
these virtual units of being (if we may call them so) only bear intension, that 
is, that they are only intense. Sometimes he says that this is the precise being 
of time. They relate within an altogether different paradigm to the one that 
4 Cf. G. Deleuze, Expressionism in Philosophy, trad. Martin Joughin, Zone Books, New 
York, 1997, pp. 110-111: «modes that differ in attribute form one and the same modification … 
Every mode is the form of a modification in an attribute, every modification the being in itself of 
modes differing in attribute».
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organizes ontic being. Number, extension, identity (and also infinity, were 
we to consider it as a numerical entity), together with the sort of existence 
involved by all of them, would only appear later on, with the passage to the 
attributes.
As we have said, the reason why Deleuze does not assume that this 
specific form of being can be provided by any attribute is that it should not 
be understood in terms of quality (and attributes are qualities, as we know), 
but as the relative lack of it. It would only be found in a stage previous, or 
different, to the qualification process put forward by attributes. 
But there is another reason for this, and it consists in that, however infinite, 
God’s intellect would still remain inscribed within the bounds of language and 
its structure. Indeed, if there is something that we owe to the structuralist 
investigation, it is precisely that it raised awareness of the strong affinity that 
holds between spatial-temporal difference, the ontic level, and language as a 
functional system. From this point of view, the modal actualization brought 
by attributes would tend to reproduce the structure that enables language, that 
is, the order thanks to which language creates sense. 
If this is the case, then it all comes down to deciding whether God’s infinite 
intellect is linguistic in form; whether the intelligibility of the essences that 
He perceives in a substance should be understood strictly within the bounds 
of linguistic meaning. Clearly, Deleuze’s post-structuralist answer is No. His 
reading tends to underline that God’s intellect must express itself in ways 
external to language (even if these would not come to be via the attributes), 
just like substance must manifests itself in ways that don’t conform to spatial-
temporal difference. 
3
Let us return to the thesis according to which each individual receives 
a series of infinite modal forms, corresponding to the infinite attributes. 
For we know that God intellects an infinite number of such attributes, and 
yet Spinoza only claims to know about two: extension (E, II, Prop. 2) and 
thought (E, II, Prop. 1). As to the rest, we remain in ignorance. The modes 
of «extension» are bodies (E, II, Def. 1), insofar as extension is realized as 
different combinations of «motion» and «rest», undergone by the internal 
parts of bodies. On the other hand, ideas are the modes of «thought» (E, II, 
Def. 3). 
And indeed, we already know enough to identify that extension and 
thought are but an earlier version of the two a priori categories that Kant 
would pose as transcendental to subjective experience: space and time. 
Bodies would differ and relate in space, while ideas would differ and relate 
220 Luis S. Villacañas de Castro
Res publica, 25, 2011, pp. 215-226
in time. As we shall see, these are, too, the dimensions along which language 
proceeds. 
But why does Spinoza limit his own knowledge of the attributes to two? 
The answer is that it is only as modes particular to this pair of attributes 
(and only to them) that human beings participate in infinite substance; that 
is, participate in God’s infinite intellect as acts of His conception. In doing 
so, they unfold the two modal infinites which saturate these two attributes. 
Indeed, they frame the human domain inside God’s infinite one. On the one 
hand, we participate in and unfold the quality «extension» because we have a 
body, because we may come in contact with other bodies, and come to realize 
thereby different variations of motion and of rest. On the other, we participate 
in and unfold the quality «thought» because we have a mind, a «thinking 
thing» as Spinoza calls it, with which we produce ideas (E, II, Def. 3). 
It might seem, then, that Spinoza places the human being in a diminished 
position by limiting his being to two attributes only. And yet, this is not so –or, 
at least, not as radically as one might suppose at first. The point is that, having 
said that a single infinity of elements is always reproduced, we now must 
conclude that the attribute thought already contains an idea corresponding 
to every element that belongs to this single infinity which is reflected, each 
time, in the light of a different essence. That is, for everything that exists in 
each of the infinite attributes, there is a corresponding idea. This mechanism 
is normally referred to as the ontological parallelism. 
The optimistic conclusion to be drawn is that there are, indeed, no more 
elements than those we may already encounter as bodies and ideas in the 
planes of extension and of thought. What really happens is that these elements 
also exist in other forms. Therefore, we are not limited regarding how much 
there is (since we still access an infinity of things), but only as to how we are 
to approach it –namely, through the attributes of extension and thought. We 
only access being in the form of ideas and bodies; and yet, through these two 
attributes, we still access all there is. Concerning the attribute thought and the 
process of knowledge that organizes it, we may know everything there is to 
know, if only in the form of ideas –obviously, since to know is precisely to 
have ideas.5
5 To intellect and to know are, therefore, different things. They reproduce the opposition 
holding between God’s intellect and human thought. God intellects infinite bodies, infinite ideas, 
and infinitely more infinite things. From this it follows that God only knows through us, since it 
is only through ideas that God and human beings may know. To know, however, also means to 
intellect adequate ideas, in opposition to inadequate ones.
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4
Now, if throughout the last section we have referred to the human being 
as a «we», as a species, it has been for exactly the same reason that we have 
spoken of infinite ideas to be conceived, or infinite bodies to be modified 
in extension. Indeed, the human genre as a whole necessarily overlaps with 
the two infinities proper to thought and extension. We said they form the 
human domain inside God’s infinite one, and neither the fact that history 
must mediate this process, nor the possibility of there being different degrees 
of knowledge (some more adequate than others), make a difference as to the 
necessary coincidence of both levels. 
And yet, this by no means implies that a single individual subject can 
grasp infinity of modes, whatever the attribute involved. As far as a single 
subject is concerned, finitude is a horizon that will not be transcended. The 
participation of each individual subject in the attributes of extension and 
thought is absolutely limited and well defined. For example, in «extension», 
one is reduced to his own body, formed of infinite smaller parts that are held 
together in a sort of balance of motion and of rest (E, II, Prop. 13 & passim). 
Corporeal organization tolerates a flexible balance also, but beyond a certain 
point (if exposed to too much strain) cohesion falls apart and a new body 
necessarily arises. 
And, as regards the attribute «thought» and the aim to be obtained 
therein, it consists in a subject being able to achieve an adequate idea 
of his own mind. For the most part, this is the goal of knowledge. And 
it is well known what this idea of the mind consists in: a complex idea 
of the body, involving as it must the ideas of the infinite smaller parts 
we have already spoken about (E, II, Prop. 15). «The object of the idea 
constituting the human mind,» says Spinoza, «is a body, or certain mode of 
extension actually existing, and nothing else» (E, II, Prop. 13). The mind 
must therefore come to know its own structure, the structure from which it 
produces ideas, as a thinking thing. 
In the fulfillment of this goal, however, a major obstacle must be 
surmounted, namely, that the mind only has at hand the ideas of those 
affections that disturb the body (E, II, Prop. 19). The point is that the 
representations of such affections have something to do with the mind itself 
and with its structure (for the mind produces them), but they do not include 
an explanation of this relation, and thus do not provide the mind with neither 
an adequate account of itself, nor of the outer bodies whose affections it 
perceives (E, II, Prop. 16, 19, 23 & passim). Indeed, we are before the causal 
dynamic that, within the field of Marxism, Althusser’s group would call 
structural causality, where an absent cause wholly determines the process of 
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cognition. We are to witness, next, a similar dynamic in Lacan’s rendition of 
psychoanalysis. 
In Spinoza’s philosophy, the possibility that the objective reality of 
extension may be experienced in itself is canceled straight away thanks to 
the independent status enjoyed by each attribute, by their absolute separation, 
by the fact that they maintain no contact with each other, even if their order 
corresponds (E, II, Prop. 7). Thus, as Spinoza defends, «the human mind does 
not know the human body itself, nor does it know that the body exists, except 
through ideas of affections by which the body is affected» (E, II, Prop. 19). We 
have seen how ideas don’t provide an adequate knowledge of the processes 
occurring in extension. And yet, adequate or inadequate as they may be (since 
both types are equally necessary and perfect), ideas shape men’s knowledge 
of being. That is, ideas define what being is for the mind.
A second thesis must be drawn therefrom, to complement the previous 
one. We have already defended that to be conceived by God’s infinite intellect 
is a precondition for being6 –of this we are sure. To this thesis we must 
now add that men have no knowledge of the reality of extension, but only 
knowledge of ideas, knowledge circumscribed in, and affected by, the reality 
proper to the modes of thought. 
This second thesis already orients us towards accepting what has become 
the major theoretical tenet of structuralism, namely, the determination of 
language over reality, over whatever we may experience or know; or –to say 
it in terms familiar to post-positivist epistemology– the theory-ladenness of 
experience. 
For, while the question as to whether God’s infinite intellect was or wasn’t 
bound to language was still a doubtful one, I think we can fully endorse 
6 If we remember well, the first one appeared in relation to the function of the attributes, 
insofar as intellect was ontological and provider of being –that is, insofar as the possibility or 
necessity of an infinite being depended, for Spinoza, on the one infinite intellect capable of con-
ceiving an infinite number of essences (the attributes), as well as all the possible modifications 
for each of them. 
Of course, once we had an infinite intellect such as God’s, infinity was a given, and from 
then on –in the case of the attribute thought, for example– the task of the human being, as a genre, 
became to actualize this structural necessity through time and history, and do so precisely through 
the concrete acts of human thought. 
That is: the human genre had to realize the infinite theoretical structure that had to exist 
insofar as God also expresses his infinity through thought and its particular modes. Now, if the 
temporal actualization of the modes enabled history to appear, the finitude and determination 
of each human being (as regards his body and his mind) enabled phenomena such as truth and 
falsity, happiness and sadness, to occur.
A qualitative aspect then became relevant amid the ontological structure defined by infinity, 
cause of itself, and infinite production. Ethics and epistemology arose amid ontology –even if 
this didn’t cancel the fact that infinity continued to be the only goal, and infinite production, the 
only teleology.
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the thesis according to which ideas in Spinoza’s philosophy, or modes of 
thought, would share the structure of language. That Spinoza refers to ideas as 
images does not rule this out –images are well suited to this paradigm. Thus, 
the identity principle and a differential and causal logic that runs along the 
vertical and horizontal axes of space and time, appear now as the principles 
ordering the modes of the two attributes we know of, bodies and ideas. 
We can now make explicit the parallelisms holding between the 
epistemological outline just described and Lacanian psychoanalysis. As 
we well know, Lacan exercised a quasi-complete linguistic determination 
of subjectivity and of all the phenomena inscribed in it, like libido and the 
forms of desire. According to Spinoza, the mind pursued an idea of its own 
structure, for this idea was necessary to obtain an adequate knowledge of 
itself and of the outer bodies the affections of which the mind perceived. 
Similarly, in psychoanalysis the subject pursues the knowledge of his or her 
subjective structure, but (just like before) stumbles upon a similar obstacle. 
For this structure includes a part (an unconscious language) the only signs of 
which are symptoms. In order to arrive at this knowledge, this unconscious 
language must be disclosed, the problem being, then, that symptoms do not 
make explicit the unconscious language from which they derive. 
We shall part with Spinoza at this point. 
5
I hope I have made clear that the confrontation between structuralism 
and post-structuralism concentrates in the extent to which one is willing to 
interpret God’s intellect and human thought from the standpoint implied by 
the linguistic structure. 
Accordingly, the answer as to what use does Deleuze make of this 
philosophy will be that he voids both God’s intellect and human thought 
of the linguistic determination that seemed to assail them. As regards 
psychoanalysis, this would mean that free-association can be truly free and 
undetermined, just like God’s creative pulse. 
On the one hand, intellectual conceptions foreign to linguistic and ontic 
difference appeared to Deleuze as a coherent conclusion to be drawn once we 
took seriously the infinite status of God’s ontological and productive intellect. 
Infinite production would include forms that men’s thought couldn’t come 
up with. And yet, we soon discovered that, surprisingly, Deleuze wanted to 
introduce these external forms within men’s thought, within the scope of 
finite subjectivity. 
In doing this, Deleuze constructs a new structure for being and subjectivity. 
The first is infinite while the second finite –yet this is not the most relevant 
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aspect, which lies elsewhere. It consists in the fact that in both levels we find 
a model of structure that cannot be closed, insofar as it retains within itself 
an undetermined part. In opposition to the logic that regulates actuality in all 
its forms (spatial-temporal entities and propositional language), this part has 
a virtual ontological status. As we recall, its main feature was that it didn’t 
comply with the identity principle. Such a structural shift entails a change 
even in respect to the most extended understanding of Spinoza’s infinity, 
which (for the most part) had been read as entailing only fully actualized 
differences. Deleuze’s new infinity, on the contrary, bears also relatively 
undetermined ones. 
This is why his private ontology, as systematized in his more personal 
books Difference and Repetition and Logics of Sense, does away with the 
Spinozean attributes altogether, for in doing so he makes sure to cancel 
the question as to whether being produces only in ways that language (or a 
human, linguistic intellect) could show. Obviously, the answer is «no». In its 
stead, he poses cause of itself as a totally unrestrained productive function, 
guided exclusively by the desire for infinite difference, whatever its form.
As regards subjectivity, I am especially interested in making explicit the 
confrontation between this understanding and the position held by Lacanian 
psychoanalysis. According to the latter, the unconscious was (also) structured 
like a language, like conscious thought. The unconscious consisted in a deposit 
of not-necessarily-syntactic, metaphoric and yet fully significant associations 
which were operative for the subject (i.e. they were libidinally invested), 
even if he or she had no knowledge of them, and which –in addition– only 
manifested in the form of symptoms. This means that the unconscious was 
fully determined, in the philosophical sense of the word. Not only did it exist 
as language (it employed a metaphorical and metonymical logic throughout), 
but the articulation of unconscious signifiers was not a matter of chance either, 
for it had a function and obeyed a reason. Unconscious associations were not 
determined by society’s syntax neither by its ideological goals, but rather by a 
traumatic event that presented the subject’s confrontation with the Father, the 
Law, and thus with the need for language itself. This would be the Freudian 
reading of Lacan’s Real, of course; that such a traumatic event actually took 
place or was fantasized was scarcely to the point, as regards its functionality. 
An individual subjective structure, whatever its form (pervert, neurotic or 
psychotic), and whatever the symptom and the desire constituted therefrom, 
could be traced back to this constituting event, for nothing except its repetition 
was enacted in symptoms, even when these referred to it elusively, and never 
in an explicit way. 
Likewise, for Lacan, desire emerged as an effect of the articulation of two 
signifiers, of linking one signifier to another, one of which was located in the 
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unconscious. Desire was caused by, and inscribed in, the law of language, 
which was instantiated by the threat of castration. 
As a contrast to all this, Deleuze doesn’t allow that the whole space of 
subjectivity be covered by language; just as he doesn’t allow the whole 
realm of being to be actual, linguistic or ontic in form; nor the whole scope 
of infinite substance to fall under the determination of the attributes –were 
we to interpret the latter as partaking of the linguistic structure. His rendition 
of the unconscious, as put forward in The Logic of Sense or with Guattari 
in Anti-Oedipus, would run parallel to our definition of virtual being and 
to its specific forms, so it would not conform to the law of language. As 
a consequence, desire is seen as free, fluid, unbounded, and undetermined; 
a reaction against every linguistic form, be it conscious or unconscious, 
individual or social. It would not emerge as an effect taking place within the 
limits of a finite, concrete and bounded structure –the only one that, according 
to Lacan, can give meaning to desire. 
Paradoxically, despite being an instance of subjectivity, Deleuze’s 
unconscious would be tuned to the dynamics of ontology: it would function 
according to the cause of itself principle, that is, in agreement with an 
unrestrained and all-accepting urge. Structurally speaking, the unconscious 
would aspire to infinity, even if it could not realize it.
6
Our main criticism to Deleuze shall now become obvious. Indeed, we 
could start by mentioning that the only reason to pose non-numerical forms 
of being is the possibility that there is an infinite intellect: God’s. The demand 
to fill the ontological space opened up by Spinoza’s definition of infinity was 
the only trigger forcing Deleuze’s to speculate about such forms. But infinity 
is both an idealist goal and point of departure for philosophy. The question 
remains, therefore, if Deleuze sustains the idealist thesis of an infinite intellect, 
which seems to me the only guarantee for his claims to virtual functionality.
And yet, we know the deeper reasons why Deleuze kept loyal to these 
virtual, undetermined forms of being. Even if they stemmed from a reflection 
on infinity, virtual being was soon put to a different use. More concretely, I 
believe it tried to answer the question concerning how does novelty occur in 
actuality. As it is common to many contemporary philosophers (for instance, 
Alain Badiou), this is the main issue that Deleuze’s philosophy tackles; in 
relation to it, his postulation of infinite being figures as a speculative and 
idealist tool. So, regarding this question, his answer was that novelty results 
from the interrelation of the actual, fully determined forms of being and 
the virtual plane; from the encounter, we might say, between linguistic or 
226 Luis S. Villacañas de Castro
Res publica, 25, 2011, pp. 215-226
actual entities and ontology, between a fully determined axis and a partially 
undetermined one. 
But, again, psychoanalysis has its own answer to novelty, and in contrast 
to Deleuze’s approach, it requires of no recourse to idealism. It is over-
determination, not indetermination (however partial), which explains novelty. 
In psychoanalysis, the new emerges out of the interrelation, encounter or 
condensation between two perfectly determined axes, those consisting of the 
conscious and the unconscious language. 
This encounter, as we know, is the psychoanalytic definition of symptom. 
